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PAUL v. NATIONAL LIFE,
LEX LOCI DELICTI AND THE "MODERN RULE":
A DIFFERENCE WITHOUT DISTINCTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of lex loci delicti has been a long-standing rule of
conflicts law when dealing with tort issues and the determination of
whether to apply the law of the state where the tortious conduct took
place or the law of the forum state. Traditionally, "the law of the
place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury"' and "[t]he place of wrong is in the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." ' 2
The doctrine has come under attack in recent years, and many states
have abandoned it, adopting one or more of the so-called modern
rules instead.
Supporters of the traditional doctrine say its advantages include
the following: ease of application, predictability of result, and uniform
application of the same law to all injured parties.3 Lex loci, or, tech-
nically, lex loci delicti commissi, is based on the "vested rights" the-
ory, which, even proponents of the lex loci doctrine agree, is out-
moded and obsolete.4
Opponents of the doctrine believe that it should be abandoned in
favor of one of the "modem rules" and say that it is harsh, un-
necessary, and unjust because of its mechanical approach. 5 In addi-
tion, there is no consideration of policy in the doctrine, it cannot
solve the complex litigation problems of the day, and it ignores in-
terests of other jurisdictions when their residents are involved in tort
1. R TATEMNT OF CONFECT OF LAWS, § 378 (1934).
2. Id. at § 377.
3. See generally, Annotation, Modem Status of Rule that Substantive Rights of Parties to a Tort
Action are Governed by the Law of the Place of the Wrong, 29 A.L.R.3d 603 (1970).
4. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872
(1956).
5. See generally, Annotation, supra note 3.
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litigation arising from events occurring in other states. Those who
argue in favor of abandoning lex loci state that the unbending ap-
plication of the doctrine is usually not justified in unintentional tort
cases because the place of occurrence of such a tort is mere happen-
stance.
6
Variations of the "modem rules" are followed by states which
reject the mechanical application of lex loci to every tort action in-
volving more than one state. The "modern rules" have in common
the theory that the applicable law is to be determined by considering
"objective" factors. Thus, the rules require analysis of all factors to
determine which law is applicable. They are not actually rules, since
they employ a subjective analysis of objective factors. The choice of
"better law" is a necessary component, implied or otherwise, of any
approach which follows one of the "modern rules."
The "modem rules" impose a duty on the forum court to un-
dertake an analysis of facts to determine which law governs. 7 Some
cases have held that the law of the forum should govern unless valid
reasons exist to apply the law of the place of the wrong.8 Other cases
have held that the law of the "predominantly concerned" jurisdiction
applies. 9 The different approaches to the "modem rules" often over-
lap and are combined with one another, and the rule is still somewhat
transitional. 10 The most frequent criticism of the "modern rules" is
that they lead to forum shopping by plaintiffs.
The doctrine of lex loci was not necessary in England. As opposed
to contracts, torts, and other substantive areas of the law, the study
of conflicts of law is of fairly recent origin. In England, the unitary
system of government did not allow conflicts to occur, and the se-
lection of applicable law was simple because of the "early centrali-
zation of power in the king and the establishment of a common law
6. See White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
7. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu,
265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970).
8. See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972) (Any significant contact with the forum is
enough; "most significant" contact is not necessary).
9. See generally, Griffith, 416 Pa. at 1, 203 A.2d at 796.
10. See generally, Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law?: From Beale to Cavers,
80 H v. L. Rav. 377 (1966) and Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
19871
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for the whole realm." 11 The confusion which has developed since Justice
Joseph Story's 1834 publication of Commentaries on the Conflict of
Laws, the first comprehensive treatment in English on the subject,
has led one casebook author to say that "[tihis may be one of the
rare legal subjects about which a page of history is worth less than
a blank sheet.' ' 2 Within the last twenty years, "the topic of choice
of law has been reshaped to an incredible extent,' ' 3 and "the choice
of law branch of conflicts . .. has recently exploded into jurispru-
dential smithereens.' 1 4 "[S]cholars disagree ... over whether no rules
are preferable to rules and over whether there is a body of conflicts
principles that are coherent enough to be worth the ... effort to
restate them."' 5
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A recent West Virginia case, Paul v. National Life, 6 reaffirmed
the adherence of the West Virginia courts to the traditional doctrine
of lex loci. In the Paul case, the administrator of an automobile pas-
senger's estate instituted a wrongful death proceeding in West Virginia
against the estate of the driver of an automobile involved in a one-
car collision in Indiana. The driver's estate moved for summary judg-
ment, alleging that the Indiana guest statute barred recovery because,
while the statute required a showing of gross negligence, only simple
negligence could be proved.' 7 The passenger's estate appealed the de-
cision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, which held that re-
covery was barred under the traditional choice of law doctrine of lex
loci.' 8 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the
Circuit Court decision, holding that while West Virginia generally ad-
heres to the doctrine of lex loci, the Indiana guest statute offended
the public policy of West Virginia and would not apply in the case.' 9
11. 0. REnsE and 0. Rosinmo, CASES AND MATERUAS ON CoNFuCT OF LAws 5 (6th ed. 1971).
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986).
17. Id. at 550-51.
18. Id. at 551.
19. Id. at 556.
[Vol. 90
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III. PRIOR LAW
A. The Traditional Doctrine
In a decision lending support to those who criticize the lex loci
doctrine because of the unfair results obtained by its mechanical ap-
plication, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held in Stewart's Adm'x
v. Bacon that "[a]n action for a tort committed in a foreign country
will lie only when it is based upon an act which will be considered
as tortious both by the law of the place where committed (lex loci
delicti commissi) and by the law of the place where the court sits (lex
loci fori) .... -20 Very few courts, however, have followed the lead
of the Bacon case.
The "place" of the wrong in the lex loci doctrine is generally held
to be where the injury or death was sustained.21 There is also authority
for the proposition that "place" is where the wrongful act or conduct
took place or where the last event occurred or the tort was completed. 22
The "place" in the modern rules is determined by a balancing of the
relative interests of the states involved.?
B. The "'Modern Rule"- Introduction
In Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., a leading case for the "modern
rule," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abandoned the traditional
rule of lex loci.2 The court noted that the "lex loci delicti rule has
been the subject of severe criticism in recent years.'"' The court said
that "[t]he basic theme running through the attacks on the place of
the injury rule is that wooden application of a few overly simple rules,
based on the outmoded 'vested rights theory,' cannot solve the com-
plex problems which arise in modern litigation and may often yield
20. Stewart's Adm'x v. Bacon, 253 Ky. 748, 749, 70 S.W.2d 522, 523 (1934) (emphasis added).
21. See Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 151 W. Va. 133, 140, 150 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1966).
22. See Chewning v. Chewning, 20 N.C. App. 283, 288, 201 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1973); Strogoff v.
Motor Sales Co., 302 Mass. 345, 347, 18 N.E.2d 1016, 1017 (1939).
23. See Daily v. Somberg, 49 N.J. Super. 469, 140 A.2d 429 rev'd 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676
(1958).
24. Griffith, 416 Pa. at 11, 203 A.2d at 800 (1964).
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harsh, unnecessary, and unjust results." ' 26 The court also noted that
"[a]lthough the overwhelming majority of writers are opposed to re-
tention of the ... rule, there is disagreement as to the successor of
that rule. '"2 7 "However ... almost all authorities agree that there must
be a policy analysis approach to replace the place of the injury rule."2
The Griffith court also said that "[tihe Supreme Court of the
United States has favorably acknowledged the recent tendency of courts
to depart from the place of injury rule in order to take into account
the interests of the state having contacts with the issues and the
parties." 2 9 One might take issue with the term "favorably" in the
foregoing quote and contend that the Supreme Court merely ac-
knowledged the trend of courts to abandon lex loci3 0 The Court made
no judgment regarding the relative worth of an approach which takes
into account state interests as opposed to the traditional approach.
While stating that the courts of Pennsylvania would now apply a
"more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and issues
underlying the particular issue before the court" and citing the case
of Babcock v. Jackson,31 the first case abandoning the doctrine of lex
loci, the court in Griffith failed to state precisely what rule it would
follow.3 2 The court did state that "in evaluating qualitatively the pol-
icies underlying the significant relationships to the controversy, our
standard will be no less clear than the concepts of 'reasonableness'
or 'due process' which courts have evolved over many years." ' 3 Fol-
lowing the analysis involved in the court's ultimate decision, however,
one may conclude that the rule adopted was that of the "government
interests" approach which will be discussed later.34
The dissent in Griffith strongly disagreed with and was highly crit-
ical of the majority opinion. Chief Justice Bell felt that "the Court's
26. Griffith, id. at 12, 203 A.2d at 801.
27. Id. at 13, 203 A.2d at 802.
28. Id. at 16, 203 A.2d at 803.
29. Id. at 20, 203 A.2d at 805, citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962) (emphasis
added).
30. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12 (1962). The relevant language is: "Recently, there
has been a tendency on the part of some States to depart from the general conflicts rule . I." d.
31. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
32. Griffith, 416 Pa. at 21, 203 A.2d at 806.
33. Id. at 22, 203 A.2d at 806.
34. See generally, Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63. Coum. L. Ray. 1212 (1963).
[Vol. 90
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Opinion creates a new test or formula which has no clear and definite
application to many factual situations which are certain to arise..."
and that "the only thing certain about the new rule is that plaintiffs
will bring their suits in or under the law of the State which allows
them to collect the most damages. '3 Commenting on the exceptions
to the application of lex loci, the Chief Justice said, "It is obvious,
if we are to progress, that there will always be exceptions to every
general rule or principle, and that neither the law nor the principle
of stare decisis can or should be as immutable as the laws of the
Medes and the Persians. '
'36
C. The "Dominant Contacts" or "'Most Significant Relationship"
Approach
There are various approaches to what constitutes the "modern
rule." The first is known as the "dominant contacts" or the "most
significant relationship" approach.37 It gives the state with the greatest
interest the ability to follow its policy.38 If the other state's law is in
conflict with a long-standing law of the forum state, the burden of
proof which must be established to apply the law of the other state
may be insurmountable. 39 Some courts have said that they will not
adopt the "most significant relationship" approach unless the policies
and interests of the states are in substantial opposition to one an-
other. 40 There is disagreement among the commentators regarding the
validity of the approach. 41
35. Griffith, 416 Pa. at 29, 203 A.2d at 809 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 31, 203 A.2d at 810.
37. See Annotation, supra note 3, § 5(b). This is the approach recommended by the RESTATE ENT
(SEcoND) CoNFliCT OF LAws.
38. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 ll.2d 42, 47, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1970); Jagers v. Royal
Indemnity, 276 So.2d 309, 312, 313 (La. 1973).
39. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp. 453, 458 (W.D. La. 1976).
40. See, e.g., Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 461-62, 506 P.2d 494, 496-97 (1973).
41. For the requirements of the approach, see RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONUCT OF LAWS, §§
6, 145, 146 (1969); see also Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 "Wash.2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). A comparison of the
Babcock case and Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd, 26 A.2d 595,
270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966) illustrates the difficulty that New York courts have had in achieving consistent
results when using this approach.
19871
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D. The "Government Interests" Approach
The second approach is known as the "government interests" ap-
proach.42 It is implicit in or a part of other approaches, but it is also
a method in and of itself. It is different from the Restatement's ap-
proach, according to one commentator.43 It is concerned with the in-
terests of the states and of the litigants. Relevant contacts are not
ignored but are examined in conjunction with an analysis of the states'
interest, the character of the cause of action, and the purposes of the
rules considered. 44 This approach has been the subject of much de-
bate.45
E. The "Choice-Influencing Considerations" Approach
A third approach is the "choice-influencing considerations"
approach.46 It involves recognition of factors which have always
influenced choice of law decisions at common law. The five
relevant considerations include the following: (1) predictability of
results; (2) maintenance of interstate order; (3) simplification of the
judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental
interests; and (5) the application of the "better rule" of law .4  In
practice, the fourth and fifth considerations are the most often
used and are considered by many to be the key factors in a
decision to apply the law of the forum court.
F. "False Conflicts"
Another manner in which some states deal with choice of law
questions is to define the problem as a "false conflict. "48 There is
42. See Annotation, supra note 3, § 5(c).
43. See Leflar, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 637-41 (1968); Reich v. Purcell,
67 Cal.2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 CAt. Rpm. 31 (1967).
44. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 1010 CaL. RpRm. 314 (1972).
45. See generally Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLutI. L. R-v. 1212 (1963). But
see Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law?: From Beale to Cavers, 80 H. v. L. Rav. 377
(1966).
46. See Annotation, supra note 3, § 5(d).
47. See Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H.
351, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (1966); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Laws, 41 N.Y.U.
L. Ray. 267, 282 (1966).
48. See generally 16 Am. JuR. 2D, False Conflicts, § 106 (1979).
[Vol. 90
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agreement that "false conflicts" exist, but confusion and disagreement
as to what constitutes them. Some states examine the relevant gov-
ernment interests, and if there is no substantial conflict, they state
that the conflict is either false or avoidable. This method has been
criticized by commentators. These critics say that there may be a "false
conflict of government interests," but not a "false conflict" of law.49
This approach involves a twofold finding: (1) Whether more than one
state is interested in the outcome of the suit; and (2) if more than
one state is interested, whether or not there is a conflict.5 0 Other au-
thorities have defined a conflict as "false" when the laws in question
are the same or reach the same result.
5'
G. Confusion of Approaches
There are other approaches to the modern rule, but the four ex-
amined above are used most frequently. Whichever "rule" is followed,
however, the factors analyzed in the decision-making process are not
truly objective factors, but are subjective, and in certain cases analysis
of the factors has created confusion. For example, in Wilcox v. Wil-
cox,12 a Wisconsin court held a Nebraska guest statute inapplicable,
and applied Wisconsin law as controlling.53 The court said:
[W]e now overrule ... cases ... that hold that the proper choice of law invariably
is lex loci delicti. We believe that this will permit a reasonable and flexible approach
that will allow the use of lex loci delicti, lex fori, or a combination of the two or
the law of a third state if it is in the interests of sound legal administration and
justice to do so.Y
"It.. .appears that lex loci frequently is not applied where the policy
of the forum state is offended, or the conscience of the forum court
is shocked. The original Restatement, Conflict of Laws, recognized
49. See generally Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law?: From Beale to Cavers, 80
HAv. L. REv. 377 (1966).
50. Id.
51. See Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603, 606 (6th Cir. 1965); and Lowe's
Hardware v. Fidelity Mut. Life, 319 F.2d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1963); see generally 16 Amr. JuR. 2D False
Conflicts, § 106 (1979).
52. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
53. Id. at 633, 133 N.W.2d at 416.
54. Id. at 621, 133 N.W.2d at 410.
1987]
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this fact . . . . 55 While it recognized that the doctrine of lex loci
should not invariably control, the court failed to reach a cognizant
conclusion as to what doctrine would control its decision in future
cases.5
6
H. Constitutionality of Choice of Law
As to the constitutionality of states choosing which law to apply,
"[ifn recent years, the Supreme Court has stoutly declined to use the
Constitution as a solvent for multi-state conflicts problems. Congress,
too, has been wary about venturing to enact conflicts statutes imposing
principles of nation-wide scope .... -57
The Supreme Court noted in Richards v. U.S.58 that "[r]ecently
there has been a tendency on the part of some States to depart from
the general conflicts rule . . . . 59 Commenting on a different but
analogous problem, Justice Black said that "[iun determining which
contact is the most significant in a particular transaction, courts can
seldom find a complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the
conflicts of law." 0 While not addressing directly the constitutionality
of allowing state courts to choose which conflicts rule to follow, the
Court noted that "[d]espite the power of Congress to enact for lit-
igation of this type a federal conflict-of-laws rule independent of the
States' development of such rules, we should not ... assume that it
has done so. ' '61
In a later case, Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,62 a federal
court did find, however, that a state having substantial ties to a trans-
action in dispute would have a legitimate constitutional interest in
applying its own rule of law.63 "If, indeed, those connections are at
55. Id. at 623, 133 N.W.2d at 411.
56. Id. at 633-35, 133 N.W.2d at 417.
57. 0. REESED 0. Rosinomo, supra, note 11, at 7.
58. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id. at 13, n.27.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912
(1963).
63. Pearson, 309 F.2d at 559.
[Vol. 90
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best tenuous, then it may be proper to conclude that the state has
exceeded its constitutional power in applying its local law." 64
Finally, in Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co.,65 the Supreme Court held
that:
'[t]he states are free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws as they choose, [citation
omitted], subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other constitutional res-
trictions. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state to adopt any
particular set of rules of conflict of laws; it merely sets certain minimum requirements
which each state must observe when asked to apply the law of a sister state."1
Based on these cases, there appears to be no problem with the con-
stitutionality of choice of law doctrine, as long as a court complies
with the restrictions of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and due
process considerations.67
L "Exception by Characterization"
Some courts have overcome the unfairness arising in certain cases
under lex loci by classifying issues as procedural rather than as sub-
stantive in nature. Instead of using the public policy exception to the
doctrine, these courts have created an "exception by characteriza-
tion." In Grant v. McAuliffe, 69 the Supreme Court of California
held that the matter of survival of a cause of action is a problem of
procedural law, rather than substantive, and is governed by the law
of the forum. The court noted the public policy exception to the lex
loci doctrine, but chose not to apply the exception to this case. 70 In-
stead, commenting that " 'substance,' and 'procedure,'. . . are not
legal concepts of invariant content,''71 the court held that "a statute
64. Id.
65. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
66. Id. at 42, n.* quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953).
67. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law,
44 IowA L. Ray. 449 (1959) and Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAw AND
Comsp. PROBS. 706 (1963); see also Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143, reh'g denied, 292 U.S. 607 (1934).
68. See generally Annotation, supra note 3.
69. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
70. Id. at 862, 264 P.2d at 946.
71. Id. at 865, 264 P.2d at 948 quoting Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert Stewart &
Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397 (1949).
19871
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or other rule of law will be characterized as substantive or procedural
according to the nature of the problem for which a characterization
must be made." 72 The dissent in the Grant case, quoting the foregoing
passage, said that the characterization exception
suggest[s] that the court will no longer be bound to consistent enforcement or uniform
application of 'a statute or other rule of Law' but instead will apply one 'rule' or
another as the untrammeled whimsy of the majority may from time to time dictate,
'according to the nature of the problem' as they view it in a given case."3
Another means of "exception by characterization" in conflicts prob-
lems is to classify the action as one founded in contract law, rather
than tort law, so the general rule is that the law of the forum applies
(lex fori). In Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Renting Co.,74 the action was
classified as one in contract, rather than tort, to allow the plaintiff
to recover under a Connecticut act which held persons renting or
leasing vehicles liable for any damaged caused by the operation of
the rented or leased vehicle.75 Massachusetts, where the accident which
injured the plaintiff occurred, had no such provisions, and Massa-
chusetts law would not have allowed recovery from the lessor of the
vehicle. 76
In both Levy and Grant, the approach taken to the conflicts prob-
lem appears to be somewhat less than realistic. These types of cases
lend credence to the view of proponents of the "modern rule" that
lex loci either leads to unfair results or that the logic of the law must
be twisted when difficult cases are presented in order for justice to
prevail. A more valid and consistent solution to the problem is util-
ization of the public policy exception to the rule. Justice Traynor,
commenting on the Grant decision,77 said that he did not consider the
case to be particularly well articulated, but that as a matter of policy,
the proper result was reached.
72. Grant, 41 Cal.2d at 865, 264 P.2d at 948.
73. Id. at 868, 264 P.2d at 950 (Schauer, J., dissenting).
74. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928).
75. Id. at 334, 143 A. at 164.
76. Id.
77. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEx. L. Rv. 657, 670 (1959).
[Vol. 90
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J. The Public Policy Exception to Lex Loci
The public policy exception to the lex loci doctrine has been in
existence since long before the Restatement of Conflict of Laws was
drafted. The exception, recognized as early as 1817 in the case of
Gardner v. Thomas,78 is also recognized in the Restatement.79 A com-
ment to the Restatement explains that a court "applies the law of its
own state, including its own conception of Conflict of Laws. It derives
this law ... from precedent, from analogy, from legal reason, and
from consideration of ethical and social need."80 The Restatement
itself says that "[n]o action can be maintained upon a cause of action
created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the
strong public policy of the forum." 8'
In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel,2 the plaintiff, a minor, and his mother
instituted a civil suit in Minnesota against the defendant for damages
resulting from defendant's illegal sale of intoxicants to the driver of
a car in which the plaintiff was a guest passenger. The driver lost
control of his vehicle after becoming intoxicated in the establishment
of the defendant and injured the plaintiff. The accident occurred in
Wisconsin, which had no act such as the Civil Damage Act of Min-
nesota under which the defendant sued.83 The trial court found that
the Minnesota Act required that the injury must occur within the state
in order for plaintiff to recover under it and dismissed the action,
citing Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sections 377 and 378.14
When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
the court stated:
[1]f the principles expressed in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Secs. 377 and 378,
are held applicable to multistate fact situations like the present, then neither the laws
of the state where the last event necessary to create tort liability took place nor the
laws of the state where the liquor dealer's violations of the liquo" statutes occurred
78. See Wilcox, 26 NVis. 2d at 623, 133 N.W.2d at 411 citing Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134
(N.Y. 1817).
79. REsTATEmENT CoNLCT oF LAws § 612 (1934),
80. RE TATEmNT Coi*cT oF LAWS § 5, conunent b (1934).
81. RESTATEumNT CoNFmICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934).
82. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
83. Id. at 377, 82 N.W.2d at 367.
84. Id. at 378, 82 N.W.2d at 368.
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would afford an injured party any remedy. . . .The result would be that here both
the interest of Wisconsin. . .and the interest of Minnesota . . . in providing for
the injured party a remedy would become ineffective . . . . We feel that the prin-
ciples in [these sections] should not be held applicable to fact situations such as the
present to bring about the result described and that a determination to the opposite
effect would be more in conformity with principles of equity and justice.
Citing cases from a number of jurisdictions in support of its conclu-
sion, the court in essence invoked the public policy exception to lex
loci.8 6 Rather than overruling prior cases or abandoning the doctrine,
the result was achieved within the constraints of lex loci.
A later case, Pevoski v. Pevoski,87 involved the issue of inter-
spousal tort immunity. Confronted with the question of the choice
of applicable law, the court stated that "[iln this Commonwealth, lex
loci delicti has been firmly established as the general tort conflicts
rule. [Citations omitted]. This rule has provided, and will continue to
provide, a rational and just procedure for selecting the law governing
the vast majority of issues in multistate tort suits."8 8 However, the
court continued, "we recognize that there also may be particular issues
on which the interests of lex loci delicti are not so strong."89 After
discussing the New York case of Babcock v. Jackson,9° the Pevoski
court concluded "that the issue of interspousal immunity should be
governed in this present case by the law of this Commonwealth. .. "
even though New York was the situs of the accident and New York
law would not allow one spouse to recover from another. 91 Massa-
chusetts had eliminated "the anachronism of interspousal immunity
... ," and the state's public policy would not tolerate spousal im-
munity from personal injury claims by the other spouse. 92
In a recent federal case, Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co.,93 the District
Court of South Carolina found that although the cause of action arose
in California, the tort theory of "market share" liability available in
85. Id. at 379, 82 N.W.2d at 368.
86. Id.
87. Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976).
88. Id. at 359, 358 N.E.2d at 417.
89. Id.
90. Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 743, 191 N.E.2d at 279 (1963).
91. Pevoski, 371 Mass. at 360, 358 N.E.2d at 418.
92. Id.
93. Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co. 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981).
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California would not be applied in the suit because it would violate
the public policy of the forum, and, therefore, the substantive law of
South Carolina would be applied.9 4 As the reason for its decision, the
court stated that "[l~t is a well settled exception to the traditional
conflicts-of-law rule of lex loci delicti that the law of the forum and
not the law of the place of the wrong is controlling whenever the law
of the place of the wrong is contrary to the public policy of the forum
state." 9 5
In a recent case involving a workmen's compensation claim, Karimi
v. Crowley,96 where the injury to the plaintiff occurred in Alabama,
but the plaintiff and the defendant were both Georgia residents, the
Court of Appeals of Georgia held that "the courts of this State will
apply Alabama law as the lex loci only to the extent that such ap-
plication would not offend the public policy of Georgia." 97 The court
found that in this case there existed a "compelling public policy matter




The Supreme Court of West Virginia, in Paul v. National Life,99
did something which most courts have failed to do when dealing with
conflicts of law in torts cases. Instead of jumping on the bandwagon
and abandoning the doctrine of lex loci delicti commissi in favor of
the "modern rules" of the Restatement, Second, Conflicts of Law,
the court demonstrated that lex loci does not require a harsh, me-
chanical application of the rule that the law of the place of wrong
governs recovery in tort. Rather, the court applied the traditional pub-
lic policy exception to the doctrine and achieved the same results that
other jurisdictions had achieved by overruling the doctrine. 1°° The court
used the established exception to lex loci instead of adopting the Re-
94. Id. at 596.
95. Id.
96. Karinii v. Crowley, 172 Ga. App. 761, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984).
97. Id. at 762, 324 S.E.2d at 584.
98. Id. at 763, 324 S.E.2d at 585.
99. Paul, 352 S.E.2d at 550.
100. Id. at 556.
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statement, Second approach or any one of the array of "modern"
approaches to questions of conflicts of law. By judicious use of the
exception, the chief advantages of the rule, those of certainty, pre-
dictability, and consistency, were retained, while the chief disadvan-
tages, those of injustice and unfairness when the rule is applied
mechanically, were overcome. All that is required is that courts NOT
apply the rule mechanically, but look instead at relevant policy con-
siderations when difficult cases arise in the application of the rule.
The court noted that all landmark cases abandoning lex loci, which
were cited by the defendant, involved guest statutes and other doc-
trines that had also been abandoned by most of the states since the
resolution of the cases. 101 The court was highly critical of the "modern
rules" and felt that other jurisdictions had overreacted by abandoning
lex loci. Commenting on the adoption of the "modem rule" by other
states, the Paul court found that:
nearly half of the state supreme courts ... have wrought a radical transformation
of their procedural law of conflicts ... to sidestep perceived substantive evils, only
to discover later that those evils had been exorcised ... by other means. Now these
courts are saddled with a cumbersome and unwieldy body of conflicts law that creates
confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency, as well as complication of the judicial
task. This approach has been like that of the misguided physician who treated a
case of dandruff with nitric acid, only to discover later that the malady could have
been remedied with medicated shampoo. Neither the doctor nor the patient need
have lost his head.02
The Paul court's primary criticism of the "modern rule," other
than the fact that the same results could be achieved within the par-
ameters of the traditional rule, was the inconsistency of results ob-
tained under the "modem rules. '"103 Citing inconsistencies in the
application of the Restatement, Second, approach, °4 the court con-
cluded that
if we are going to manipulate conflicts doctrine in order to achieve substantive results,
we might as well manipulate something we understand. Having mastered marble,
101. Id. at 551.
102. Id. at 553.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 554 citing Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963);
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we decline an apprenticeship in bronze. We therefore reaffirm our adherence to the
doctrine of lex loci delicti today. However, we have long recognized that comity
does not require the application of the substantive law of a foreign state when that
law contravenes the public policy of this state [citation omitted]. 1"
Addressing the concern of many commentators that exceptions to
the rule of lex loci would lead to forum shopping by plaintiffs, the
court limited its holding to cases where venue is proper under some
provision besides W. VA. CODE § 56-1-1(a)(4). 1' This section provides
that:
a) Any civil action or other proceeding, except where it is otherwise specifically
provided, may hereafter be brought in the circuit court of any county:
4) if it be against one or more nonresidents of the state, wherein any one of them
may be found and served with process, or may have estate or debts due him
or them .... 107
Thus, "[tihis State must have some connection with the controversy
above and beyond mere service of process before the rule we announce
today will be applied."'' 0
The dissent in the Paul case was concerned that "we appear to
be manipulating our conflict of law rule so that the insurance company
loses."'' 9 Based on the foregoing discussion, however, regarding the
applicable case law from other jurisdictions, it cannot be said that
the majority of the court was forging a radical new path in the field
of conflicts law. Rather, the majority merely found a means of util-
izing existing doctrine, while making exceptions for extraordinary cases,
as other jurisdictions have done. The mere fact that insurance com-
panies are usually the defendants in tort actions of the type which
create the difficult cases for traditional conflicts law doctrine does not
mean that the court is exhibiting unfair prejudice against insurance
companies by utilization of the public policy exception.
In Mellk v. Sarahson, a case very similar to Paul involving the
application of a guest statute, 10 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
105. Paul 352 S.E.2d at 556.
106. Id. at 556 n.14.
107. W. VA. CODE § 56-1-1(a)(4) (Supp. 1986).
108. Paul, 352 S.E.2d at 556 n.14.
109. Id. at 557 (Brotherton, J., dissenting).
110. MeUk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967).
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did not abandon the rule of lex loci but merely utilized the public
policy exception to the doctrine in the same manner as the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals utilized the exception in Paul.
The Mellk court stated that:
the advantages of uniformity, certainty and predictability often attributed to the lex
loci delicti approach must yield when an unvarying and mechanical application of
this rule would cause a result which frustrates a strong policy of this State while
not serving the policy of the state where the accident occurred.'"
Paul was not the first case in which West Virginia recognized the
public policy exception to lex loci. In Perkins v. Doe,112 the plaintiffs
were injured when the car in which they were riding was forced off
the road in the state of Virginia. The Perkins' instituted a "John
Doe" suit against the unknown driver of the other car in a West
Virginia circuit court. The action was later removed by the Perkins'
liability insurer to the federal court. The Perkins' were both residents
of West Virginia, their vehicle insurance policy was delivered to them
in West Virginia, and their car was licensed in West Virginia." 3 The
West Virginia uninsured motorist statute requires a physical contact
between vehicles in order for coverage to apply. 114 The Virginia un-
insured motorist statute requires no such "touching" between vehi-
cles." 5 The court held that under the traditional doctrine of lex loci
delicti, West Virginia courts apply the law of the place of the wrong
in tort cases."16
The case arose as a result of questions certified by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The
question which is relevant to this discussion asks: "[D]oes the doctrine
that lex loci must yield when it conflicts with the public policy of the
lex fori bar Plaintiffs' claims?" [citations omitted]." 7
The Perkins court answered that "this variation in the statutory
language of the two states does not reflect such a conflict in public
111. Id. at 234, 229 A.2d at 629.
112. Perkins v. Doe, 350 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1986).
113. Id. at 712-13.
114. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (Supp. 1986).
115. Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 516, 125 S.E.2d 159, 165 (1962).
116. Perkins, 350 S.E.2d at 713.
117. Id. at 713 n.l.
[Vol. 90
17
Melton: Paul v. National Life, Lex Loci Delicti and the Modern Rule: A Di
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
LEX LOCI DELICTI
policy as to require that the law of the place of wrong must yield.""'
In response to the frequently cited justification for the physical
contact requirement of the West Virginia uninsured motorist statute,
prevention of fraud or collusion, the court said "that blindly enforcing
the physical contact requirement might deter the informed motorist
from taking evasive action in a treacherous driving situation. This
certainly would not advance any public policy of the State of West
Virginia.""
9
Justices Brotherton and Neely dissented, with Justice Brotherton
contending that "the action is not one based in tort, but one based
on statute and contract, West Virginia statute, and contract."20 There-
fore, the uninsured motorist provision of West Virginia should have
applied, the dissent argued, not the Virginia provision.1
2'
Thornsbury v. Thornsbury"22 is the leading West Virginia case deal-
ing with the issue of which state's law to apply in difficult cases. The
case was before the court as a result of the death of a sixteen-year
old girl. She was killed in an accident involving an automobile driven
by her aunt in the state of Ohio."23 She was a guest passenger in the
automobile, and the court noted that Ohio had a guest statute barring
recovery, whereas West Virginia did not have such a statute. 24
The court stated that "[iln an action prosecuted in this state for
recovery of damages for personal injury or for wrongful death caused
in a foreign jurisdiction, the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction
controls the right of recovery but the adjective law of this state is
applied to and controls the remedy."121
Referring to the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the court said that
"[tihe rule applies with full force also in the application of the guest
statute of the foreign state in which the cause of action arose."' 126
118. Id. at 713 n.2.
119. Id. at 714 n.4.
120. Id. at 715.
121. Id.
122. Thornsbury v. Thomsbury, 147 W. Va. 771, 131 S.E.2d 713 (1963).
123. Id. at 773, 131 S.E.2d at 715.
124. Id. at 774, 131 S.E.2d at 716.
125. Id. at 771, 131 S.E.2d at 714 (Syl. pt. 1).
126. Id. at 773, 131 S.E.2d at 715-16.
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However, the court concluded that the degree of negligence necessary
to satisfy the requirement of the foreign guest statute, that of wanton
and wilful misconduct, could be found by the jury to have been sat-
isfied in this case. 27 Therefore, no public policy exception to the doc-
trine of lex loci was needed or utilized. Also, the decision came at a
time when automobile guest statues were more common than they are
at present.
In a more recent case involving the application of a foreign guest
statute to a resident of West Virginia, Ireland v. Britton,'28 the West
Virginia Supreme Court found that the minor plaintiff, a thirteen-
year old boy, only needed to prove ordinary negligence in order to
recover. 2 9 The court based the decision on a case by the Virginia
Supreme Court, Smith v. Kauffman,30 in which it was held that the
standard of gross negligence used in the Virginia guest statute "does
not apply to an injured guest passenger under the age of fourteen
years and. . .recovery may be obtained on the allegation of ordinary
negligence." 13' Once again, the public policy exception to lex loci was
not needed or utilized in order for the court to reach its decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Over twenty years after the decision in Wilcox, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit demonstrated that the con-
fusion engendered by the various approaches to the so-called "modern
rule" persists. In the case of Klippel v. U-Haul Co. of Northeastern
Michigan, 32 the court stated that "conflicts of laws questions in tort
cases are usually to be resolved on the basis of lex loci delicti. The
New York courts will depart from that rule only in 'extraordinary
circumstances' [citation omitted], Refusals to enforce guest statutes of
other jurisdictions ... are examples of such extraordinary circum-
stances.'" 3
127. Id. at 782, 131 S.E.2d at 720.
128. Ireland v. Britton, 157 W. Va. 327, 201 S.E.2d 109 (1973).
129. Id. at 332, 201 S.E.2d at 112.
130. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
131. Ireland at 111.
132. Klippel v. U-Haul Co., 759 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1985).
133. Id. at 1180.
[Vol. 90
19
Melton: Paul v. National Life, Lex Loci Delicti and the Modern Rule: A Di
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
LEX LOCI DELICTI
Since the New York case of Babcock v. Jackson led the way in
abandoning the doctrine of lex loci in favor of the "modern rule",
does the Klippel case tell us that many courts have followed the path
of the "modern rule" only to eventually end up where they started,
or, as the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals contends in the
Paul case, was there any reason to follow the path in the first place,
when the path of lex loci was well-worn and predictable? It seems
that sometimes courts are too eager to abandon "old" rules of law
when they perceive inequities in the law. However, as the Paul case
demonstrates, many times these "old" rules are not as inequitable as
they appear to be at first glance. Often, if a court were to take the
time to fully research the issue, it would find that exceptions to the
rules exist which, if utilized judiciously, allow the court to reach the
desired result. Flexibility in the application of "harsh" rules is often
reflected in exceptions to those rules, not only in the area of conflicts
doctrine, but in all areas of the law where unyielding adherence to
a doctrine may produce inequitable results.
It is an old saying that "haste makes waste." The Paul court is
saying that those courts which have adopted the "modern rule" in
favor of lex loci have indeed been too hasty in their decision. Now,
when faced with the prospect of applying the "modern-rule" to dif-
ferent factual situations, those courts are finding that the search for
consistency in decisions is a true waste of time.
Perhaps a comment by Justice Cardozo concerning the lex loci
doctrine is appropriate. "We shall have to feel our way here as else-
where in the law. Somewhere between worship of the past and ex-
altation of the present, the path of safety will be found."''3 4
V. A. (Bo) Melton, Jr.
134. B. Caiaozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 160 (1921).
1987]
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/12
